Jonathan Aboky-Djanty

01 / FLIGHT DECK REDESIGN

Redesigning safety-critical flight deck hardware under fleet-wide failure risk

A legacy switch design started failing across the fleet. I owned the investigation, the redesign, and the case for change — end to end.

02 / PROBLEM

A legacy switch was failing under real-world use, and the fleet-wide risk was mounting

The voice command equipment’s toggle switch was originally designed decades ago, before anyone could anticipate how frequently pilots would actually use it. As failures grew more common across the fleet, they created compounding risk: slower aircraft production due to part reliability and rework, reduced in-service aircraft availability from grounding, escalating maintenance costs, and a real risk of FAA noncompliance. The challenge: fix the failures without compromising pilot ergonomics or the physical constraints of the existing system.

ROLE

Owner, end to end

TEAM

Cross-functional × 5

TIMELINE

42 weeks

STATUS

Approved & implemented fleet-wide

42

Weeks, problem to approval

5

Stakeholder groups aligned

3

Design options evaluated before selection

1,000+

In-service aircraft receiving the redesign

03 / ROOT CAUSE

A supplier-partnered investigation ruled out every toggle-based fix

I led a root cause investigation with the supplier and worked directly with pilots and fleet teams to understand real-world use. The switch was being actuated far more often, and with more force, than it was ever tested for — and the supplier confirmed no toggle switch on the market could meet the required force, cycle count, and reliability within the existing equipment envelope. That ruled out patching the current design.

04 / SOLUTION

Three paths forward, and only one avoided a full cockpit redesign

I ran a design workshop with stakeholders across voice command systems, materials, electrical, human factors, and reliability to align on requirements. Two options carried major costs: continued maintenance, and a larger toggle switch that would expand the equipment envelope and trigger a full cockpit redesign across materials, circuitry, and the glare shield.

The third option, a different switch type entirely, avoided both. I sourced an off-the-shelf push-button switch and validated it through circuit analysis before formal testing: it drew less power, supported a higher cycle count, and introduced no long-term derating concerns.

05 / VALIDATION

Human factors and quality testing both had to clear the switch before it could ship

I partnered with the supplier on mockups and a functional prototype, then presented the concept at Technical Design Review to secure approval for formal testing. The design then had to clear two independent bars: human factors testing confirmed intuitive, repeatable operation with no added pilot workload, and quality testing — environmental, electrical, lifecycle — confirmed the switch held up under high cycle counts with no degradation. Both passed, and I consolidated the results into a final implementation package for leadership review.

06 / OUTCOME

Fleet-wide risk retired, and the fix is flying on Boeing’s newest aircraft

The redesign was approved for implementation across more than 1,000 in-service aircraft, and positioned for rollout on future programs, including the 777X family. In May 2026, Lufthansa's first 777-9 — the 777X launch aircraft — completed its first flight, flying with the same flight deck control panels I design and own at Boeing. By retiring the risk early, we preserved production cadence and delivered a fully validated solution without a single compromise to pilot ergonomics.

07 / REFLECTION

The hardest part wasn’t the engineering — it was catching every risk early

Working cross-functionally meant every stakeholder was affected by any change I made, and comprehensively identifying risk while navigating multiple open issues at once was the real challenge. The lesson that stuck: doing the due diligence to surface risks early limits rework later — and balancing speed, quality, and risk is a constant judgment call, not a one-time decision.

Some technical specifics — supplier names, exact part specifications — are generalized to respect Boeing's proprietary information.

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